
















tion	of	distributional	 conflicts	emerges.	 In	a	 recent	paper,	Fehr	et	al.	 (2011)	analyze	a	
buyer‐seller‐relationship	with	 incomplete	 contracts	 and	 ex	 ante	uncertainty	 regarding	
the	sellers’	cost	level	to	test	these	effects.	We	re‐run	their	experiment	and	introduce	an‐
other	 treatment	with	 exogenously	 determined	 contract	 types.	 Like	 FHZ	we	 find	 refer‐
ence	point	effects	in	both	treatments.	However,	uncooperative	shading	behavior	in	our	








                                                 
*		 We	would	like	to	thank	Eva	Schulze	Heuling	for	outstanding	research	assistance.	
**		 Email:	Mathias	Erlei	(m.erlei@tu‐clausthal.de),	Christian	Reinhold	(crein@tu‐clausthal.de).	
TO CHOOSE OR NOT TO CHOOSE– M. ERLEI & C. REINHOLD 
‐	2	‐	
1  Introduction  






fixing	of	prices	under	competitive	 terms,	buyers’	 and	 sellers’	 aspiration	 levels	become	
compatible	so	that	neither	aggrievement	of	any	trading	partner	nor	the	delivery	of	bad	
quality	 (“perfunctory	 performance”	 or	 “shading”)	 will	 occur.1	 In	 this	 way,	 concluding	
contracts	with	rigid	terms	serves	to	reduce	inefficiency.		
However,	 making	 rigid	 contracts	 has	 its	 own	 drawback.	 Irrevocable	 fixing	 of	 the	




sence	 of	 non‐contractable	 investments	 and	 an	 explanation	 of	 rigid	 employment	 con‐
tracts.		











not	provide	 low‐quality	products.	At	 the	 final	 stage,	 sellers	decide	whether	 to	provide	
normal	or	low	quality.	Note	that	a	delivery	of	low	quality	increases	the	seller’s	costs	so	
that	no	seller	has	a	material	incentive	to	make	such	a	delivery.		
By	 and	 large,	 the	 results	 of	 Fehr	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 are	 in	 line	 with	 those	 of	 Hart	 and	
Moore	(2008).	There	is	less	shading	in	rigid	contracts,	although	sellers	use	their	poten‐
tial	 for	 	 increasing	prices.	 This	definitely	 supports	 the	view	of	 rigid	 contract	prices	 as	
reference	points.	Two	robustness	checks	also	support	Hart	and	Moore	(2008):	(a)	reduc‐








termination	 of	 (auction)	 prices	 induces	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 the	 provision	 of	 low	
quality	(Fehr	et	al.	(2009)).		
Fehr	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 admit	 that	 two	 features	 of	 their	 experimental	 results	 are	 quite	
surprising.	First,	they	find	very	little	perfunctory	performance	with	rigid	contracts.	This	
is	 surprising	 because	 payoffs	 are	 highly	 asymmetric	 in	 these	 cases	 and	 standard	
measures	of	fairness	or	inequity	aversion	suggest	much	more	perfunctory	performance.	
Furthermore,	the	act	of	choosing	rigid	contracts	itself	can	be	interpreted	as	an	uncoop‐
erative	behavior	 that	deserves	punishment	via	 the	delivery	of	 low	quality.	Second,	 the	
unexpectedness	of	this	finding	is	increased	because	there	is	much	more	perfunctory	per‐
formance	in	 flexible	contractual	relations	even	though	the	payoff	asymmetry	 is	signifi‐











ing	 rigid	 contracts?	 and	 (2)	why	 do	 sellers	 not	 appreciate	 buyers’	 voluntary	 price	 in‐









tracts,	 perfunctory	 performance	decreases	 substantially.	 Our	 interpretation	 of	 (a)	 and	
(b)	 is	 that	 the	 subjects	 in	 our	 experiment	 do	 indeed	 punish	 buyers	 for	 choosing	 rigid	
contracts.	We	call	this	a	reciprocity	effect.	Additionally,	(c)	there	is	significantly	less	per‐
functory	performance	if	 flexible	contracts	are	determined	exogenously	than	if	the	buy‐







els	 increase	with	 respect	 to	 their	 share	 of	 the	 surplus.	 This	will,	 in	 turn,	make	 sellers	
more	inclined	to	provide	perfunctory	performance	if	buyers	turn	out	to	be	less	generous	
















ment,	 changes	 into	 a	 one‐sided	 or	 bilateral	monopoly.	 In	 all	 treatments,	we	have	 two	
different	kinds	of	contracts,	i.e.,	rigid	and	flexible	contracts,	and	this	brings	our	experi‐
ment	in	line	with	the	model	proposed	by	Hart	and	Moore	(2008).		
We	 implemented	 two	 different	 treatments,	 an	 endogenous	 contract	 treatment	
(EndCT)	and	an	exogenous	contract	 treatment	 (ExCT).	The	EndCT	 is	closely	related	 to	
the	design	of	Fehr	et	al.	(2011).	In	our	ExCT	we	abolish	the	buyers’	ability	to	choose	be‐
tween	 contract	 types.	Each	 session	 consists	of	15	 such	periods.	 Figure	2	 (given	 in	 the	






The	 determination	 of	 contract	 types	 varied	 between	 the	 two	 treatments.	 In	 the	
EndCT,	buyers	decide	whether	to	choose	the	rigid	or	the	flexible	contract	design.	In	the	
ExCT,	 the	 contract	 design	 is	 exogenously	 given	 to	 the	 participants.	 The	 difference	 be‐
tween	the	designs	relates	to	the	process	of	determining	the	final	product	price.	In	rigid	





trade	 to	 be	 accomplished.	 In	 flexible	 contracts,	 buyers	 may	 increase	 product	 prices	
above	the	level	given	by	the	auction	if	they	wish	to	do	so,	and	trade	is	always	feasible.	







price	by	 clicking	 a	button	on	 the	 computer	 screen.	The	 first	 seller	 accepting	 the	price	






od,	while	 buyers	 can	 buy	 just	 one	widget.	 This	means	 that	 any	 seller	may	 serve	 both	
buyers,	while	any	buyer	can	only	buy	from	one	seller.	Consequently,	there	is	an	excess	
supply,	which	creates	a	highly	competitive	auction	environment.	Unlike	in	FHZ,	the	auc‐
tions	 for	 the	 two	possible	 contracts	 in	 each	 group	 are	 conducted	 simultaneously.	 The	
auction	boxes	are	randomly	placed	next	 to	each	other	on	 the	computer	screen.	Sellers	
are	free	to	engage	in	any	of	the	auctions	as	long	as	none	of	them	has	accepted	an	auction	

























Quality	of	the	widget	 normal	 low	 normal	 low	
Seller’s	cost	 20	 25	 80	 85	

































All	 sessions	were	 conducted	 in	 December	 2008	 and	 January	 2009.	We	 conducted	












of	 determining	 contract	 types	may	 lead	 to	 different	modes	 of	 behavior.	 In	 particular,	





garding	profits.	Assuming	that	 this	will	 increase	sellers’	aspiration	 levels,	 low	price	 in‐
crements	will	not	meet	sellers’	aspiration	levels	and	provoke	shading.	In	summary,	ac‐
cording	to	our	considerations,	the	feasibility	of	actively	choosing	contract	types	increas‐
























a) In	both	 treatments,	auction	prices	converge	 toward	 the	competitive	equilibri‐
um,	pA	=	35.	
b) On	 average,	 prices	 for	 flexible	 contracts	 are	 lower	 than	 prices	 for	 rigid	 con‐
tracts.	
While	rigid	contracts	 leave	no	room	for	price	adjustments,	 flexible	contracts	allow	
buyers	 to	 increase	 prices	 within	 the	 price	 range	 above	 the	 competitive	 lower	 price	
bound.	This	opportunity	may	affect	 the	sellers’	shading	decision	so	 that	 increasing	the	
price	may	 encourage	 sellers	 not	 to	 provide	 low	 quality.	 This	 price	 decision	 at	 date	 1	






providing	 low	quality.	 Unlike	 in	 the	 ultimatum	game,	 the	 seller	 can	 lower	 the	 buyer’s	
profit	by	only	40	points	in	our	experiment,	and	his	costs	increase	by	only	5	points.	In	line	
with	 Forsythe	 et	 al.	 (1994),	we	 expect	 that	 buyers	will	 pay	prices	 significantly	 higher	
than	the	lower	price	bound	to	avoid	shading.		
FHZ	show	that	buyers	are	indeed	willing	to	pay	significant	price	increments	associ‐












a) In	 both	 treatments,	 buyers	 pay	 prices	 that	 are	 higher	 than	 the	 lower	 price	
bound	in	flexible	contracts	and	consequently	price	increments	above	zero.		












ment	 effect	 is	 larger	 in	 rigid	 contracts	 or	 in	 flexible	 contracts.	 If	 shading	 due	 to	 the	







ExCT,	 then	 the	 reference	 point	 hypothesis	must	 be	 rejected.	 Finally,	 if	 shading	 in	 the	
ExCT	is	smaller	than	in	the	EndCT	and	if	shading	under	flexible	contracts	is	greater	than	



























In	 this	 section	we	present	 and	discuss	 our	 results.	 In	 the	EndCT,	we	 find	 surprisingly	
large	 deviations	 from	 the	 results	 presented	 in	 FHZ.	 Buyers	 choose	 flexible	 contracts	




that	 the	results	presented	 in	FHZ	are	also	driven	by	 factors	other	 than	pure	reference	

















vide	 subjects	with	any	 statistical	 information	about	 the	aggregate	profitability	of	 rigid	









ically	 trained	participants	 favored	the	 less	profitable	but	(with	respect	 to	 the	distribu‐
tion	of	profits)	fairer	contract	type.		
After	the	buyers	had	chosen	their	contract	types,	all	contracts	were	auctioned	off	to	






It	 can	easily	be	seen	that	 the	auction	prices	 in	 the	 first	periods	are	well	above	35	and	
converge	over	time	to	the	equilibrium	price.	In	the	final	five	periods,	mean	auction	pric‐
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accept	 contracts	 in	 equilibrium.	 If	 sellers	 prefer	 one	 type	 of	 contract	 to	 the	 other,	we	
should	 find	 that	sellers	 first	 try	 to	get	 this	contract	 type	and	only	subsequently	accept	
the	other	one.	This	implies	that	prices	for	preferred	contracts	will	be	lower	than	prices	
for	the	other	contracts.		
Comparing	sellers’	profits	 shows	 that	 in	 flexible	 contracts,	 sellers’	profits	 are	 sub‐























crement	of	10.95	points.	 Thus,	 in	 accord	with	our	 conjectures,	 the	 removal	 of	 buyers’	











Table	3	 confirms	our	post‐experimental	observations.	 It	 shows	 the	mean	price	 in‐
crement	with	respect	to	the	two	different	treatments.	None	of	the	differences	between	






	 Bad	 Good	 Total	
















iment.	 Following	 Hart	 and	Moore	 (2008),	 we	 refer	 to	 the	 provision	 of	 low	 quality	 as	
“shading”.	 Our	main	 research	 question	 is	 whether	 the	 difference	 in	 shading	 behavior	
with	respect	 to	contract	 types	may	not	only	be	 interpreted	as	a	 reference	point	effect,	
but	also	as	reciprocity	and	signaling	effects.	If	behavior	in	the	ExCT	is	significantly	dif‐
ferent	 from	behavior	 in	 the	 EndCT,	 there	must	 exist	 some	 additional	 effects	 that	 FHZ	
subsume	under	reference	point	effects.		





















ExCT	 ‐‐‐	 0.15	 0.08	 0.22	
Note:	Numbers	are	relative	frequencies	of	shading.	Numbers	in	parentheses	
represent	the	corresponding	relative	frequencies	of	shading	in	FHZ.		





Things	 are	 somewhat	 different	 in	 the	 ExCT.	 Compared	 to	 endogenous	 contracts,	
shading	is	substantially	and	significantly	smaller	 in	all	combinations	of	states	and	con‐
tract	types	(one‐sided	rank	sum	test;	p	<	0.05).	Furthermore,	in	good	states,	there	is	less	
shading	 in	 rigid	 contracts	 than	 in	 flexible	 contracts.	Our	 results	 clearly	 contradict	Hy‐
pothesis	4a	(pure	reference	points)	and	support	Hypothesis	4b.		
RESULT	4:		






contract	 treatment.	 Furthermore,	 shading	 remains	 above	 zero,	 and	 there	 is	
more	shading	in	flexible	than	in	rigid	contracts.		
It	is	remarkable	how	much	more	shading	we	find	in	rigid	contracts	when	compared	
















Rigid	 Flexible	 Rigid	 Flexible	
Bad	 Good	 Bad	 Good	 Bad	 Good	 Bad	 Good	
p35	=	0	 	 .333	 .488	 .409	 	 .091	 .125	 .333	
0	<	p35	≤	5	 	 .313	 .200	 .404	 	 .191	 .000	 .308	
5	<	p35	≤	10	 	 .385	 .100	 .412	 	 .231	 .167	 .071	
10	<	p35	≤	15	 	 .000	 .667	 .188	 	 .000	 .000	 .200	
15	<	p35	 	 .000	 	 .205	 	 .000	 	 .156	
Note:	Numbers	are	relative	frequencies	of	shading.		
Our	 results	 indicate	 that	 it	makes	 a	 difference	whether	 contracts	 are	 determined	
endogenously	or	exogenously.	Endogenously	determined	rigid	contracts	clearly	result	in	
more	 shading	 than	 exogenously	 determined	 contracts.	 When	 sellers	 had	 to	 decide	
whether	to	shade	or	not,	the	only	difference	between	the	two	treatments	was	that	buy‐

































To	 conduct	 a	more	 rigorous	 test,	we	 performed	 some	 econometric	 estimations	 of	
shading	behavior.	 In	our	data	set,	shading	 is	given	by	the	binomial	variable	shading.	 It	
equals	1	 in	 the	case	of	 shading	and	zero	 in	case	of	normal	quality.	Final	prices	can	be	
separated	into	auction	prices	(priceauc)	and	price	increments	(priceinc).4	Table	6	shows	
that	 the	reference	point	effect	 is	 the	same	 for	endogenous	and	exogenous	contracts.	 It	
refers	only	to	the	choice	of	contract	type.	FlexC	is	the	corresponding	variable	(1	for	flex‐
ible	 contracts	and	zero	 for	 rigid	contracts).	The	 reciprocity	effect	 applies	only	 to	 rigid	
and	endogenous	 contracts.	The	binomial	 variable	 endorigid	 covers	 this	 effect.	This	 in‐
teractive	variable	is	1	for	rigid	contracts	in	the	EndCT	and	zero	otherwise.	The	signaling	








































































































N	 525	 525	 525	 525	 525	 525	
LL	 ‐249.3	 ‐249.3	 ‐249.7	 ‐248.1	 ‐248.5	 ‐248.1	
LL(0)	 ‐280	 ‐280	 ‐280.1	 ‐279	 ‐279.3	 ‐279	





(140	– 	95)	than	in	good	states	(140	– auction	price		140	– 	35).	Consequently,	compara‐
tively	modest	price	 increments	 in	bad	 states	 look	more	generous	 than	do	 larger	price	
increments	 in	good	states.	Second,	 the	distribution	of	payoffs	 is	more	unequal	 in	good	
states	 than	 in	bad	states.	For	example,	 if	 the	buyer	chooses	a	price	 increment	of	15	 in	
bad	states,	the	two	players’	payoffs	are	identical.	In	good	states,	however,	the	same	price	
increment	induces	highly	unequal	payoffs,	i.e.,	ߨ஻ ൌ 90and	ߨௌ ൌ 30.6		














௜ܷ ൌ ߨ௜ െ ߙ௜ max൛ߨ௝ െ ߨ௜, 0ൟ െ ߚ௜max൛ߨ௜ െ ߨ௝, 0ൟ,	






















 there	 is	evidence	 for	 the	existence	of	 reference	point	effects,	 reciprocity	ef‐
fects	and	signaling	effects;		
 all	three	effects	are	of	a	similar	order	of	magnitude;		














particularly	 rigid	prices	may	serve	as	 reference	points	 that	 can	prevent	ex	post	 ineffi‐
ciencies	 caused	by	 incompatible	 subjective	 entitlements.	 In	 this	paper,	we	 find	 results	
deviating	significantly	 from	those	of	 the	 first	 test	presented	by	Fehr	et	al.	 (2011).	FHZ	
provide	 remarkable	 support	 for	Hart	 and	Moore	 (2008).	 However,	 they	 admit	 to	 find	
some	other	surprising	results.	In	particular,	they	find	no	evidence	of	negative	reciprocity	
due	 to	 buyers’	 uncooperative	 choices	 regarding	 contract	 types	 and	 surprisingly	 little	
remuneration	 for	 buyers’	 voluntary	 increases	 of	 contract	 prices.	 Because	 we	 regard	
their	 explanation	 as	 rather	 unconvincing,	 after	 having	 performed	 a	 replication	 treat‐
ment,	we	introduce	a	new	treatment	in	which	buyers	can	no	longer	determine	contract	
types.	In	the	new	treatment,	contract	types	are	exogenously	determined	by	the	experi‐
menter.	 According	 to	 Fehr	 et	 al.’s	 interpretation	 of	 their	 data,	 this	 change	 in	 experi‐
mental	design	should	not	have	an	 impact	on	behavior.	We	find,	however,	that	the	new	
design	 results	 in	 a	 substantial	 change	 in	 behavior.	 Furthermore,	 subjects’	 behavior	 in	
replicating	sessions	differs	significantly	from	the	behavior	of	subjects	in	FHZ.		






sults	 in	 a	 decrease	 in	 shading	 of	 approximately	 50	 percent	 for	 both	 rigid	 and	 flexible	












occurs	 mainly	 about	 outcomes	 within	 the	 contract	 and	 not	 about	 the	 contract	 itself”	
(Fehr	et	al.	(2011),	p.	497)	is	not	supported	by	our	data.		
Third,	we	also	 find	evidence	 for	 the	 existence	of	 reference	point	 effects.	These	ef‐
fects	are	manifest	 in	 the	 smaller	 shading	 in	 rigid	 contracts	when	compared	 to	 flexible	
contracts,	given	final	prices	and	treatments.	Fourth,	 in	our	experiment,	reference	point	
effects	are	of	a	smaller	magnitude	than	in	FHZ.	In	particular,	they	are	smaller	than	the	
treatment	 effects.	 Fifth,	 we	 find	 evidence	 for	 the	 relevance	 of	 social	 preferences	 and	
fairness	considerations	with	respect	to	payoff	asymmetries.		
In	summary,	we	find	that	it	is	not	only	contract	types	and	their	corresponding	refer‐
ence	 point	 effects	 that	 determine	 sellers’	 shading	 behavior,	 but	 also	 the	 process	 by	
which	contract	 types	are	selected.	 In	our	experiment,	sellers	 take	 into	account	buyers’	





as	 reference	points	without	ex	ante	 competition.	However,	 the	experimental	design	of	
FHZ	establishes	only	one‐sided	competition	and	gives	all	market	power	 to	 the	buyers.	
There	is	no	competition	between	buyers	at	all.	We	believe	that	this	does	not	really	cor‐






often	 highly	 incomplete	 in	 real	 life,	 it	 remains	 to	 be	 seen	 whether	 the	 actual	 experi‐



















matum	 bargaining”,	 Journal	 of	 Economic	Behavior	 and	Organization,	 3(4),	 367‐
388.	

















Contract	Type	 Rigid	 Flexible	 Rigid	 Flexible	
Rel.	Freq.	of	Contracts	 .277	 .723	 .48	 .52	
Auction	Price	(mean)	 38.69	 37.41	 38.44	 37.03	
Final	Price	(mean)	 38.69	 47.57	/	97.8	 38.44	
48.38	/	
98.87	
Rel.	Freq.	of	low	quality	 .322	 .341	 .147	 .184	
Profit	Buyer	(mean)	 65.69	 61.2	 73.12	 70.88	


























2. Buyer determines 
contract type 
 
























7. Profit calculation 
rigid contract flexible contract 
bad bad good good 
80 % 20 % 
No trade 
   
Buyer and seller 






95  p  140 
Buyer choose 
price  






















80 % 20 % 
no.  low low low no. no. 
Legend: 
low  – low quality 
no.  – normal quality 
pSt3 – auction price 
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